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2I. Introduction 
The late 1990s were good for worldwide business. Stock markets were exuberant, 
multinationals were selling to the far corners of the planet, and the world was more or less at 
peace. But like the month of March, the 20th century ended like a lamb and the 21st started like a 
lion. The 2000 American presidential election proved to be an affair more complex than simply 
counting votes, September 11, 2001 became a date forever etched in my generation’s mind, and 
in November 2001 the fifth-largest1 American company, Enron, went bankrupt. In lemming-like 
fashion, companies around the world followed Enron in revealing scandalous corporate and 
accounting policies. 
Just as turn of the century events sent President George W. Bush to war with Afghanistan 
and Iraq, Senator Paul Sarbanes and Congressman Michael Oxley went to war against bad 
corporate practices. Their product, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), became the standard-
bearer for how government would regulate business. The Irish and the European2 responses to 
scandals mirror SOX. 
This paper reviews and comments upon how the American, Irish, and European 
governments responded to this millennium’s corporate scandals. Part II reviews the roots and 
effects of corporate scandals. Part III digresses slightly from the main purpose by introducing the 
basics of Irish and European corporate law. This introduction is included to facilitate 
understanding of Part IV, which reviews recent American and Irish corporate governance 
legislation and European Union (E.U.) regulations, directives, and proposals. Part V compares 
and contrasts these government responses. It concludes that the Irish legislative response was out 
of proportion to Irish scandals, but that it fits into a greater mold of convergence in which the 
 
1 Enron ranked 5 on the 2002 Fortune 500 list. See 
http://www.fortune.com/fortune/fortune500/articles/0,15114,373322,00.html (Last visited Nov. 23, 2005). 
2 When I use “European” or “Europeans” I am referring to the European Union (E.U.). 
3U.S provides the model for corporate governance and the E.U. acts as a competent body to 
facilitate convergence of diverse corporate practices. 
II. Scandals 
American accounting scandals are well known on both sides of the Atlantic.3 Not known 
to most Americans (or even to much of the Irish and European public) are the instances of 
corporate malfeasance on the eastern side of the Atlantic. This section reviews the major 
corporate and accounting scandals that served as catalysts for the governmental action which is 
reviewed in Part IV. 
A. American Scandals 
Enron & Arthur Andersen 
Enron hid assets and liabilities in over 2,000 businesses, many of which where wholly-
owned special purpose entities (SPEs) that were not included on the Houston energy trader’s 
financial statements.4 Enron booked loans as revenue and often sold that debt to its SPEs, again 
recording revenue from the sale.5 In November 2001, Enron restated earnings and debt for the 
years 1997-2000. It reduced earnings by $28 million for 1997, $133 million for 1998, $153 
million for 1999, and $91 million for 2000. It increased debt (by returning liabilities held in SPEs 
back to its own balance sheet) by $711 million for 1997, $561 million for 1998, $685 million for 
 
3 See e.g. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 Yale L.J. 
1521, 1528 (2005); John Paul Lucci, Enron – the Bankruptcy Heard Round the World and the International Ricochet 
of Sarbanes-Oxley, 67 Alb. L. Rev. 211 (2003); Marianne M. Jennings, Primer on Enron: Lessons From A [sic] 
Perfect Storm of Financial Reporting, Corporate Governance and Ethical Culture Failures, 39 Ca. W. L. Rev. 163 
(2003); Robert W. Hamilton, Seventh Annual Frankel Lecture Address: The Crisis in Corporate Governance: 2002 
Style, 40 Hous. L. Rev. 1 (2003); Luca Enriques, Bad Apples, Bad Oranges: A Comment from Old Europe on Post-
Enron Corporate Governance Reforms, 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 911 (2003); Communication from the Commission 
to the Council and the European Parliament -- Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in 
the European Union -- A Plan to Move Forward, COM (2003) 284 final (May 2003), p.5 (“The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
adopted on 30 July 2002 in the wave of a series of scandals…” [emphasis added]);  
4 Hamilton, supra note 4, at 8-9. 
5 Id. at 9. 
41999, and $628 million for 2000.6 “Nearly a third of Enron's reported income came from 
misclassification of transactions as revenues.”7 Even before Enron’s bankruptcy, its auditor, 
Arthur Andersen, LLP (Andersen), classified it “as a ‘maximum risk’ client - meaning that it 
adopted and used the most aggressive permissible accounting principles.”8
Andersen had a number of conflicts of interest in its Enron account: it generated more 
revenue from providing consulting services ($27 million) than it did from providing auditing 
services ($25 million); the “staffs of Enron and Andersen were inextricably intertwined;”9 and 
Andersen was Enron’s internal and external auditor.10 Such was the conflict that Andersen was 
convicted of obstruction of justice for shredding Enron-related documents.11 Andersen ceased to 
be an auditor of public companies on September 1, 2002 and shut down completely soon after.12 
WorldCom 
Ashburn, Virginia-based telecom giant WorldCom, Inc. (WorldCom) restated earnings 
downward by $3.8 billion in June 2002. It had booked expenses as capital investments, thus 
turning an expenditure of cash into a capital asset.13 The company that emerged from bankruptcy 
had a market capitalization of less than $1 billion from a high of $115 billion.14 It also changed 
its name to MCI. 
Andersen audited WorldCom.15 
6 Cherie J. Owen, Board Games: Germany’s Monopoly on the Two-Tier System of Corporate Governance and Why 
Post-Enron United States Would Benefit From its Adoption, 22 Pa. St. Int’l L. Rev. 167, 170 (2003). 
7 Hamilton, supra note 4, at 12. 
8 Id. at 8. 
9Jennings, supra note 4, at 213. 
10 Id. at 214. 
11 Hamilton, supra note 4, at 8. 
12 Jonathan D. Glater, Last Task at Andersen: Turning Out the Lights, N.Y. Times, at C3, Aug. 30, 2002. 
13 Hamilton, supra note 4, at 21. 
14 Owen, supra note 7, at 170. 
15 Hamilton, supra note 4, at 22. 
5Qwest 
Qwest Communications International (Qwest), the dominant local phone company in 
fourteen states from Minnesota to Washington, improperly listed $1.16 billion as current profits 
rather than capital investments. While making its restatement on July 28, 2002, it wrote off $20-
$30 billion in intangible assets.16 
Andersen audited Qwest.17 
Global Crossing 
Global Crossing built an underwater fiber optic network that connected continents via the 
internet. When traffic did not pan out as expected, Global Crossing engaged in a scheme of 
“swapping” capacity with other telecommunications companies such as Qwest and recording the 
transactions as earnings. The company filed for bankruptcy in January 2002.18 
Andersen audited Global Crossing.19 
Adelphia 
In March of 2002, Adelphia Communications disclosed that it had made loans worth $2.3 
billion to its controlling shareholders, the Rigas family, without recording the transactions on its 
balance sheet. In June 2002, the company announced that it had $500 million less in revenue 
than it had reported over the previous two years. The company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, 
listing $18.6 billion in debt. Its stock price fell to $.01.20 
16 Id. at 24. 
17 Jennings, supra note 4, at 215. 
18 Jennifer S. Recine, Examination of the White Collar Crime Penalty Enhancements in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 39 
Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1535, 1540-1541 (2002). 
19 Jennings, supra note 4, at 215. 
20 Owen, supra note 7, at 171; Hamilton, supra note 4, at 23-25. 
6Tyco 
Tyco International lost $100 billion in market capitalization when its CEO Dennis 
Kozlowski was indicted on charges of New York state sales tax evasion.21 Kozlowski used 
company money as his own, spending lavishly for personal expenses and at one point receiving a 
loan for $19 million which the Tyco board forgave without shareholder knowledge. The 
company recorded a loss of $2.32 billion in 2002.22 
ImClone and Martha Stewart 
ImClone Systems (ImClone) CEO Samuel Waksal learned on December 25, 2001 that 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) planned to reject ImCone’s application for approval of 
a cancer drug. One day later, Waksal, his family, and friends began selling ImClone shares. Two 
days later, on December 28, 2001, ImClone publicly announced the FDA rejection and its share 
price dropped from $70 to $10. Waksal and friends saved $9 million by selling ImClone shares 
two days before the public announcement.23 
Waksal was caught and pleaded guilty to insider trading.24 One of his friends, lifestyle 
doyenne Martha Stewart, was convicted of obstruction of justice for lying to authorities about 
her sale of ImClone stock. She served five months in prison.25 Within 30 minutes of her 
conviction the share price of Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia dropped from $17 to $10.86 and 
Stewart had paper losses of $186 million.26 
21 Hamilton, supra note 4, at 26. 
22 Id. at 27. 
23 Id. at 28-29. 
24 Id. at 29. 
25 David Glovin, Judge Refuses to Cut Stewart’s Detention, Wash. Post, at E01, Apr. 12, 2005. 
26 Neil Irwin, For the Stewart Brand, an Uncertain Future, Wash. Post, at A04, Mar. 8, 2004. 
7B. Irish Scandals 
Elan 
Elan Corporation (Elan) is an Irish pharmaceutical company headquartered in New York. 
Its common stock trades on the Irish Stock Exchange and its American Depository Receipts 
(ADRs) trade on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).27 In its 2002 annual report, Elan 
reduced its 2001 reported income by $73 million and its cash flow by $500 million.28 Elan’s 
market capitalization fell from $20 billion in June 2001 to $600 million in July 2002.29 Plaintiffs 
in a 2004 Elan securities litigation suit estimated that Elan inflated profits by $648.8 million.30 
Elan engaged in an accounting practice called “roundtripping” whereby Elan provided 
loans to third parties which the third parties then returned to Elan soon after. Elan recorded the 
loans as capital investments and booked the return as revenue.31 Elan’s roundtripping schemes 
came in four flavors: joint business ventures (JBVs), a product rationalization program, risk 
sharing arrangements, and SPEs.32 
Elan inflated sales income by entering into JBVs with other firms. Elan contributed 
money to the JBV which the JBV then used to purchase a license from Elan for medical 
technology. Elan recorded the purchase of the license as income. Elan also shifted its substantial 
research and development expenses to JBVs.33 
In its product rationalization program, Elan sold royalty rights to other companies. The 
other companies paid for these rights with funds provided by Elan. Elan recognized income from 
the sale of royalties but did not record the expense of financing the transaction. Elan also 
 
27 In re Elan Corp. Sec. Lit., 2004 U.S. Dist LEXIS 9913, 4 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)[Elan]. 
28 Id. at 3. 
29 Shame About the Name, Economist, Jul. 13, 2002. 
30 Elan, 2004 U.S. Dist LEXIS 9913, 14. 
31 Id. at 6. 
32 Id. at 6-7. 
33 Id. at 7-9. 
8recognized the entire income from the sale in the year the sale took place rather than spreading 
the income over the length of the royalty contract.34 
In its risk sharing arrangements, Elan financed its research and development by selling 
royalty rights to products under development. Elan characterized the money it received as sales 
when in fact they were reimbursements for research and development costs already incurred.35 
Elan sold securities in JBVs to three SPEs at great profit. The SPEs did not have cash to 
buy the securities; they recorded debt for the purchases. Elan recorded profit on the sale, even 
though it never received cash. In 2000 and 2001, Elan recorded gains of $40 million on the sale 
of securities to SPEs. Elan guaranteed the SPE debt, but did not record the guarantees as debt on 
its own balance sheet.36 
In addition to roundtripping, Elan had an ingenious compensation scheme that enriched 
executives to the tune of $20 million. Elan paid “royalties” to a company called Monksland. 
Monksland distributed its good fortune to its shareholders, all of whom were Elan executives. As 
such, Elan conveyed money to executives without disclosing the compensation to shareholders.37 
Allied Irish Banks 
Allied Irish Banks (AIB) is an Irish banking conglomerate with shares quoted on the Irish 
and London stock exchanges and ADRs quoted on the NYSE.38 At Allfirst Bank (Allfirst), a 
wholly owned subsidiary located in Maryland, a rogue currency trader named John M. Rusnak 
 
34 Id. at 9-10. Elan’s income recognition scheme violated SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin 101. See Id. at 9. 
35 Id. at 10. 
36 Id. 12-13. 
37 Id. at 13-14. 
38 See 
http://www.aib.ie/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=AIB_Investor_Relations/Miscellaneous/ir_article_printer&c=AI
B_Article&cid=1096576937320&channel=IRHP (last visited Nov. 18, 2005). 
9(Rusnak) caused Allfirst to restate earnings downward by $691 million.39 A report commissioned 
by AIB found: 
The fraud was carefully planned and meticulously implemented by Mr Rusnak, 
extended over a lengthy period of time, and involved falsification of key bank records 
and documents. 
Mr Rusnak circumvented the controls that were intended to prevent any such 
fraud by manipulating the weak control environment in Allfirst's treasury; notably, he 
found ways of circumventing changes in control procedures throughout the period of his 
fraud. 
Mr Rusnak's trading activities did not receive the careful scrutiny that they 
deserved; the Allfirst treasurer and his treasury funds manager - the principal persons 
responsible for Mr Rusnak's supervision - failed for an extended period to monitor Mr 
Rusnak's trading. 
At both the AIB Group and Allfirst levels, the Asset and Liability Committees 
("ALCOs"), risk managers, senior management and Allfirst internal auditors, all did not 
appreciate the risks associated with Mr. Rusnak's hedge-fund style of foreign exchange 
trading; even in the absence of any sign of fraudulent conduct, the mere scope of Mr 
Rusnak's trading activities and the size of the positions he was taking warranted a much 
closer risk-management review. 
Allfirst and AIB senior management heavily relied upon the Allfirst treasurer, 
given the treasurer's extensive experience with treasury functions and foreign exchange 
trading in particular. In hindsight, this heavy reliance proved misplaced. 
Nothing has come to attention during the course of the review that indicates that 
anyone at AIB or Allfirst, outside of the Allfirst treasury group, were involved in, or had 
any knowledge that, fraudulent or improper trading activity was occurring at Allfirst 
before the discovery of the fraud.40 
An AIB ADR-holder, Tomran, Inc. (Tomran), filed a derivative suit alleging that AIB and 
Allfirst directors “were negligent and grossly negligent in their oversight of Rusnak, which 
resulted in the loss to Allfirst Bank.”41 Tomran sought money damages and declaratory and 
injunctive relief.42 The Maryland Court of Special Appeals dismissed the suit, holding that under 
 
39 Tomran, Inc. v. Passano, 862 A.2d 453, 455 (Md. App. 2004)[Tomran]. 
40 AIB and Allfirst Implement Actions to Address Issues Raised by Fraudulent Trading Activities, March 14, 2002. 
Available at 
http://www.aib.ie/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=AIB_Investor_Relations/AIB_Press_Releas/aib_d_press_releas
es&c=AIB_Press_Releas&cid=1015597171590&channel=HP (last visited Nov. 18, 2005). 
41 Tomran, 862 A.2d at 456. An appeal is pending before the Maryland Court of Appeals. See Tomran, Inc. v. 
Passano, 872 A.2d 46 (Md. 2005) (granting plaintiffs’ petition for a writ of certiorari). 
42 Tomran, 862 A.2d at 455. 
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Irish law a shareholder has no standing to enforce a right of the corporation via a derivative suit. 
In Ireland, derivative suits are “uncommon and difficult to sustain.”43 
Rusnak pleaded guilty to bank fraud and received a 7½ year prison sentence.44 He must 
repay $691 million to Allfirst in $1,000/month increments. At that rate, his debt will be repaid in 
57,583 years.45 
C. European Scandals 
Royal Ahold 
Dutch food retailer Royal Ahold N.V. (Ahold) has been described as “Europe’s Enron.”46 
Ahold ADRs trade on the NYSE and its common stock trades on exchanges in Amsterdam, 
Brussels, Paris, and Zurich.47 “Like many American firms during the bubble years, Ahold started 
to bend the accounting rules, claiming profits of acquired firms as ‘organic growth’, booking 
capital gains from sale-and-leaseback deals as profit, and keeping billions in debt off its balance 
sheet.”48 In February 2003, Ahold announced it was restating earnings downward by $500 
million because of accounting inaccuracies at an American subsidiary, U.S. Foodservice, Inc. 
(USF). Ahold’s stock price dropped more than 60%.49 Ahold had 2002 losses of $1.4 billion and 
in 2003 wrote off $3.1 billion in debt related to USF.50 Two accounting practices in particular 
caused most of Ahold’s problems: improperly booking income from vendor rebates and inflating 
revenue from joint ventures.51 USF prematurely booked vendor rebate revenue and colluded with 
 
43 Id. at 466. 
44 Ex-Currency Trader Sentenced to Seven and a Half Years, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 2003. 
45 57,583, Wash. Post, at E02, Jan. 20, 2003. 
46 Europe’s Enron, Economist, Mar. 1, 2003. 
47 In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Lit., 351 F. Supp. 2d 334, 348 (Md. 2004)[Royal Ahold]. 
48 Europe’s Enron, Economist, Mar. 1, 2003. 
49 Royal Ahold, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 344-345. 
50 Sara Kehaulani Goo, Royal Ahold Writes Off $3.1 Billion On Md. Unit, Wash. Post, at E01 Oct. 3, 2003. 
51 Royal Ahold, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 344-345. 
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vendors to falsely inflate rebate amounts.52 In its joint venture foray, Ahold attributed the entire 
revenue from five joint ventures to itself when it only should have recorded revenue 
proportionate to its ownership of the ventures. Ahold restated its revenue for 2001 and 2002 by 
$24.8 billion.53 
Parmalat 
Parmalat Finanziaria SpA (Parmalat), the Italian dairy giant, has also been described as 
“Europe’s Enron.”54 The company understated debt by $10 billion and overstated assets by $16.4 
billion.55 Parmalat’s problems stemmed from a need for continual cash infusions to cover losses 
in certain South American ventures, to service debt, and to fund the lifestyle of CEO Calisto 
Tanzi and his family. To get cash from banks, the company had to look healthy. To look healthy, 
Parmalat either engaged in complex transactions with its 130 subsidiaries56 or told outright lies, 
at one point booking a fictitious sale of $620 million worth of powdered milk to Cuba. In a 
typical transaction, Parmalat would send a phony invoice to a subsidiary and record an accounts 
receivable asset. It would then sell the subsidiary’s debt to banks in exchange for cash. When the 
bank sought payment from the subsidiary, Parmalat lent the subsidiary cash, recording the 
transaction as an investment in a subsidiary rather than a loan. The bank loans Parmalat obtained 
meant more debt to service which required more cash infusions. 57 Parmalat issued bonds 35 
times between 1995 and 2003, creating $5 billion of debt.58 “In short, Parmalat and its 
confederates were operating something akin to a Ponzi scheme.”59 
52 Id. at 345. 
53 Id. at 345. 
54 Peter S. Goodman, From Hometown Success to Global Scandal, Wash. Post, at A01 Jan. 10, 2004. 
55 In re Parmalat Sec. Lit., 375 F. Supp. 2d 278, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)[Parmalat]. 
56 Peter S. Goodman, From Hometown Success to Global Scandal, Wash. Post, at A01 Jan. 10, 2004. 
57 Parmalat, 375 F. Supp. 2d at 283-284. 
58 Peter S. Goodman, From Hometown Success to Global Scandal, Wash. Post, at A01 Jan. 10, 2004. 
59 Parmalat, 375 F. Supp. 2d at 283-284. 
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Italian law required that Parmalat change auditors in 1999. To hide its fraud from its new 
auditor Deloitte & Touche, Parmalat assigned its fraudulent transactions to its Caribbean-based 
subsidiary Bonlat. Bonlat continued to be audited by Parmalat’s old auditor, Grant Thornton.60 
Parmalat’s scheme fell under its own weight in late 2003 when it could not pay bonds, its 
stock lost half its value, trading was suspended for a few days, and the company announced that 
a Bank of America account ostensibly worth $4.9 billion did not actually exist. It filed for 
bankruptcy on December 24, 2003.61 
III. Introduction to Irish and European Corporate Law 
A description of basic Irish and European corporate law is included to facilitate 
understanding of the recent changes in Irish and European corporate law. 
A. Irish Corporate Law 
1. Sources of Law 
Irish corporate law (called company law in local parlance) has statutory roots; 
corporations did not exist at either English or Irish common law. The basic statutes are contained 
in 11 legislative acts starting with the Companies Act 1963. Much of the current Irish regulatory 
scheme is relatively new, having its foundations in the Company Law Enforcement Act, 2001 
(CLEA)  and the Companies (Auditing and Accounting) Act 2003 (CAAA). The CLEA and the 
CAAA are described in detail in Part IV. 
2. Form and Formation 
Irish corporations come in two basic forms: private companies limited by shares (where 
the name of the corporation is followed with “Ltd.”) and public limited companies (noted by 
“plc” following the company name). Forming a company requires registration with the 
 
60 Id. at 284. 
61 Id. at 284. 
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Companies Registration Office62 and two constitutional documents: the Memorandum of 
Association (Memorandum) and Articles of Association (Articles).63 The Memorandum must 
contain the company name, an objects clause describing what the company has the capacity to 
do, a statement of limited liability, and the initial number of shares and amount of share capital.64 
The Articles are the company’s bylaws. If a newly-formed company does not register Articles, 
model Articles found in an appendix to the Companies Act 1963 apply.65 
3. Risk 
Irish corporations have a separate legal personality and shareholder liability is limited to 
the amount of subscribed share capital.66 Shares must have a par value.67 Shareholders in a 
public company must pay up at least 25% of their share’s nominal value whereas shares in 
private companies need not be paid up at all.68 Public companies must issue a minimum of 
€38,092 in share capital.69 Upon winding up, the liability of shareholders for company debts is 
limited to any amount unpaid on their shares.70 
Pre-incorporation contracts entered into by subscribers are binding on the company;71 
however, companies have a limited capacity to contract (think of children today or women two 
centuries ago). They may only perform those acts listed in the objects clause of their 
Memorandum. Consequently, objects clauses often run many pages. The doctrine of ultra vires is 
still alive in Ireland, and courts may refuse to enforce contracts if they find that a company was 
 
62 See www.cro.ie. The CRO issues certificates of incorporation. 
63 Paul Egan, Irish Corporate Procedures, 2d ed., Jordan Publishing Limited, at 19-20 (1996)[Egan]. 
64 Christopher Doyle, Company Secretary, Thomson Round Hall Dublin, at 4-6 (2002)[Doyle]. 
65 Egan, supra note 64, at 19. 
66 See Salomon v. A Salomon & Co Ltd (UK)(1897); PWC, Doing Business in Ireland at 13 (2004). 
67 Egan, supra note 64, at 21. 
68 Id. at 22. 
69 PWC, Doing Business in Ireland at 15 (2004). 
70 Doyle, supra note 65, at 1. 
71 Egan, supra note 64, at 21. 
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trying to do an act not listed in its objects clause.72 However, the doctrine of ultra vires has been 
modified by statute to protect third parties who reasonably were not aware of the company’s 
violation of its own objects clause.73 
The courts have discretion to pierce the corporate veil if “justice…requires it.”74 
4. Return on Investment 
Whether to issue dividends or to retain earnings is a board decision.75 Dividends may 
only be paid out of the profits of a solvent company.76 Companies may issue common, preferred, 
and redeemable shares.77 Public companies can issue shares by offering them to the public 
(usually with the underwriting of a merchant bank, called “issuing house”78), or offering them to 
preexisting shareholders either as a stock dividend or under right of first refusal circumstances.79 
Public companies may list with and trade securities on the Irish Stock Exchange.80 The stock 
exchange regulations are collected in the “Yellow Book.”81 Among the more important rules 
found in the Yellow Book are that at least a quarter of a company’s shares must be in the hands 
of the public, a company must have been a going and solvent concern for at least three years 
prior to listing, and the company must have a market capitalization of at least €1.14 million.82 
It is common in Ireland for a company with un-issued share capital to issue “bonus 
shares.” Bonus shares are a dividend to existing shareholders of shares representing the value of 
 
72 See Companies (Amendment) Act 1983 §45. 
73 See Companies Act 1963 § 8. 
74 Power Supermarket v. Crumlin Investments and Dunnes Stores (Crumlin) Ltd (1981)(lifting the corporate veil on 
a group structure because “the justice of the case so requires it”). See also The State (McInerney & Co Ltd) v. 
Dublin County Council (1985)(“The arm which lifts the corporate veil must be that of equity”). 
75 Bond v. Barrow Hematite Steel Co (1902). 
76 Eavan Murphy, Irish Company Law Revision, Gill & MacMillan, at 41 (1999)[Murphy]. See also Part IV of 
Companies Act 1983. 
77 Egan, supra note 64, at 32. 
78 Doyle, supra note 65, at 26. 
79 Murphy, supra note 77, at 26. 
80 Egan, supra note 64, at 34. 
81 Doyle, supra note 65, at 27. 
82 Id. at 28. 
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the capital account. They are not simple share dividends (i.e., a 3 for 1 split where the holder of a 
share worth $100 receives three shares each worth $33.33). They are a distribution of rights to 
existing capital (i.e., a 1 for 3 bonus will give a shareholder owning three shares worth 
$100/share one share that is also worth $100. The value of his shareholdings increases from $300 
to $400). The company’s capital is not diminished. Instead, the rights to that capital are divided 
amongst the current shareholders.83 
Companies may issue bonds (commonly called debentures). Irish companies usually 
secure their debentures with company assets – as such, they are closer to mortgages than 
American-style debt offerings.84 A debenture-holder can secure his debt via either a fixed charge 
or a floating charge. A fixed charge ties the security to a specific asset, whereas a floating charge 
becomes a fixed charge (“crystallizes”) only if the company goes bankrupt or the parties agree to 
a specific time or event.85 Fixed charges have priority over floating charges and both have 
priority over shareholder interests.86 
5. Corporate Control 
Shareholders 
Shareholders are often called members. Public companies must have a minimum of two 
members.87 Private companies may have a minimum of one member and a maximum of 50 
members (excluding current and former employees).88 Members must meet at least once in a 
calendar year and meetings cannot be more than fifteen months apart.89 
83 Id. at 244. 
84 Id. at 193. 
85 Murphy, supra note 77, at 47-49. 
86 Id. at 49. 
87 Egan, supra note 64, at 31. 
88 Id. at 31. 
89 Id. at 33. 
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Shares in public companies are freely transferable whereas shares in private companies 
may be transferred only with board approval.90 
Directors and Secretaries 
All companies must have at least two directors and one company secretary.91 The 
secretary may be one of the two directors. The secretary need not be a natural person - often an 
accounting firm acts as secretary for several companies.92 The directors and secretary are 
collectively the officers of the company.93 
Directors have almost unlimited powers to exercise the objects of the company.94 This 
power is limited by the fiduciary nature of the position and may be further mitigated by the 
Articles of Association and shareholder resolutions.95 If a director’s failure to properly oversee 
the company leads to insolvency, the director may be personally liable for the debts of the 
company.96 
The secretary is often the chief administrative officer and thus has the agency power to 
contract for the company.97 The secretary’s functions are wide-ranging but ill-defined; he is to 
oversee the administration of the company and compliance with the Companies Acts. Perhaps his 
most important duty is to make and file the annual return to the Registrar of Companies.98 
Irish law has no mandatory requirements for board meetings.99 
Each year, a third of the directors must offer to resign.100 
90 Murphy, supra note 77, at 33. 
91 Companies Act 1963 §§ 174-175 
92 Doyle, supra note 65, at 58. 
93 Companies Act 1963 § 2 
94 Doyle, supra note 65, at 46-47. 
95 Id. at 46. 
96 Companies Act 1990 § 204 
97 Murphy, supra note 77, at 67. 
98 Doyle, supra note 65, at 230. 
99 Egan, supra note 64, at 22. 
100 Murphy, supra note 77, at 58. 
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Examiners 
A court may appoint an examiner when a company is unlikely to be able to pay its debts. 
Appointment of an examiner is a step to save a company before a receiver or liquidator is 
appointed.101 The goal of the examiner is to give a distressed company “breathing space,” akin to 
the protection provided by Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Act 1978.102 The examiner 
researches the affairs of the company and reports to the court whether he thinks the company can 
continue as a going concern and what changes must be made to foment that goal. The court may 
order that the examiner take over management from the board.103 
Receiver 
Debenture-holders whose debt has fallen into arrears can ask a court to appoint a 
receiver. The receiver’s task is to sell the attached assets and pay off the debenture.104 The 
appointment of a receiver suspends directors’ powers with regard to the charged asset.105 The 
receiver is a fiduciary to the debenture holder. His duty to the company is to report a “statement 
of affairs.”106 The appointment of a receiver is often a last step before bankruptcy.107 
Liquidator 
When a company is bankrupt and folds, a court appoints a liquidator.108 In the case of 
voluntary liquidations, the company appoints its own liquidator.109 In either case, the liquidator is 
a fiduciary to the company who must sell the assets, pay the debts, and distribute surplus.110 
101 Id. at 91. 
102 See Doyle, supra note 65, at 259. 
103 Murphy, supra note 77, at 92. 
104 Id. at 54. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 56. 
107 Doyle, supra note 65, at 199. 
108 Companies Act 1963 §  225 
109 Id. §  258 
110 Murphy, supra note 77, at 97. 
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6. Duration 
Once a company is formed it has perpetual succession. The company ceases to exist 
when it is wound up by its members (voluntary liquidation) or when a court orders a bankrupt 
company to fold (compulsory liquidation).111 Creditors may seek voluntary liquidation, a sort of 
private bankruptcy where the company deliberately agrees to fold and pay off debts.112 
B. European Corporate Law 
Current E.U. company law is comprised of three Regulations,113 thirteen Directives or 
Proposals for Directives,114 and three Recommendations.115 While corporations must still 
 
111 Id. at 6. See also Companies Act 1963 § 213 for the rules on court-ordered windups. 
112 Murphy, supra note 77, at 97. 
113 Council Regulation (EEC) 2137/85 of 25 July 1985 on the European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG); 
Council Regulation (2001/2157/EC) of 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a European Company SE supplemented by 
Council Directive (2001/86/EC) of 8 October 2001 supplementing the Statute for a European Company with regard 
to the involvement of employees; Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
19 July 2002 on the application of international accounting standards. 
114 First Council Directive 68/151/EEC of 9 Mar. 1968 on coordination of safeguards which, for the protection of the 
interests of members and others, are required by Member States of companies within the meaning of the second 
paragraph of article 58 of the Treaty, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent throughout the Community 
(OJ L 065, 14/03/1968, p. 8); Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC of 13 Dec. 1976 on coordination of safeguards 
which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of companies within 
the meaning of the second paragraph of article 58 of the Treaty, in respect of the formation of public limited liability 
companies and the maintenance and alteration of their capital, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent (OJ 
L 026, 31/01/1977, S. 1); Third Council Directive 78/855/EEC of 9 Oct. 1978 based on article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty 
concerning mergers of public limited liability companies (OJ L 295, 20/10/1978, p. 1); Fourth Council Directive 
78/660/EEC of 25 July 1978 based on article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty on the annual accounts of certain types of 
companies (OJ L 222, 14/08/1978, p. 11); Amended proposal for a Fifth Directive founded on article 54(3)(G) of the 
Treaty concerning the structure of public limited companies and the powers and obligations of their organs (OJ C 
240, 09/09/1983, p.2); Sixth Council Directive 82/891/EEC of 17 Dec. 1982 based on article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty, 
concerning the division of public limited liability companies (OJ L 378, 31/12/1982, p. 47); Seventh Council 
Directive 83/349/EEC of 13 June 1983 based on the article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty on consolidated accounts (OJ L 
193, 18/07/1983, p. 1); Eighth Council Directive 84/253/EEC of 10 Apr. 1984 based on article 54(3)(g) of the 
Treaty on the approval of persons responsible for carrying out the statutory audits of accounting documents (OJ L 
126, 12/05/1984, p. 20); Proposal for a Tenth Directive of the Council based on article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty 
concerning cross-border mergers of public limited companies (OJ C 023, 25/01/1985, p. 11); Eleventh Council 
Directive 89/666/EEC of 21 Dec. 1989 concerning disclosure requirements in respect of branches opened in a 
Member State by certain types of company governed by the law of another State (OJ L 395, 30/12/1989, p. 36); 
Twelfth Council Company Law Directive 89/667/EEC of 21 Dec. 1989 on single-member private limited-liability 
companies (OJ L 395, 30/12/1989, p. 40); Proposal for a Thirteenth European Parliament and Council Directive on 
company law concerning takeover bids (OJ C 162, 06/06/1996, p. 5); Proposal for a Fourteenth Directive on 
Liquidation (unofficially published in Lutter, Europaisches Unternehmensrecht 302 ff. 
115 Commission Recommendation (2001/256/EC) of 15 November 2000 on quality assurance for the statutory audit 
in the European Union: minimum requirements; Commission Recommendation (2001/453/EC) of 30 May 2001 on 
the recognition, measurement and disclosure of environmental issues in the annual accounts and annual reports of 
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incorporate in Member States, the E.U. has taken steps towards the European Company and two 
of these Regulations deal with company form. In 1985, the European Economic Interest 
Grouping (EEIG) became the first supranational company form in Europe.116 The EEIG allowed 
a framework for independent companies to cooperate but it “gained only limited importance.”117 
In 2001, the E.U. passed a Regulation creating the European Company (Societas Europaea or 
SE).118 An SE is able to operate throughout Europe on the basis of one uniform legal and 
administrative regulation. Creating an SE is rather difficult as the company must have a 
minimum share capital of €120,000 and cannot be formed directly but must emerge from a pre-
existing Member State-incorporated company.119 
One other E.U. Regulation affecting corporations deals with accounting standards. The 
statute mandates that publicly traded companies meet International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB) standards when preparing public accounts.120 
E.U. company law Directives mandate corporate disclosure requirements, including 
disclosure of a company’s constitutional documents; minimum capital requirements for public 
companies; that Member States make laws governing mergers and divisions; the layout and 
content of balance sheets and profit & loss statements; that companies with subsidiaries prepare 
consolidated accounts; qualifications for auditors; rules for branches of companies operating in 
other Member States; and the existence of single member private limited liability companies.121 
companies; Commission Recommendation (2002/590/EC) of 16 May 2002 on “Statutory Auditors’ Independence in 
the EU : A Set of Fundamental Principles.” 
116 See Council Regulation (EEC) 2137/85 of 25 July 1985 on the European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG). 
117 Andreas Kellerhals & Dirk Truten, Creation of the European Company, 17 Tul. Eur. & Civ. L.F. 71, 75 (2002). 
118 See Council Regulation (2001/2157/EC) of 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a European Company SE 
supplemented by Council Directive (2001/86/EC) of 8 October 2001 supplementing the Statute for a European 
Company with regard to the involvement of employees. 
119 Kellerhals, supra note 119, at 72, 77-78. 
120 Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 July 2002 on the application 
of international accounting standards. 
121 See supra n.113. 
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E.U. Commission company law Recommendations call for quality assurance systems for 
statutory audits; recognition, measurement, and disclosure of environmental issues; and propose 
fundamental principles for statutory auditors.122 
IV. Government Response to Scandal 
A. U.S. Response: SOX 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 became law on July 30, 2002.123 It changes the 
oversight and responsibilities numerous corporate actors. 
1. Auditor Regulation 
Prior to SOX, the auditing profession was self regulated.124 That changed with the 
establishment of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).125 The PCAOB is 
a nonprofit corporation126 that regulates auditors by setting audit standards and investigating 
violations of SEC rules and regulations. It can sanction violators with fines of up to $15 million, 
censures, removal from auditing projects, limitations on activities, and suspension.127 Its 
activities are funded by mandatory fees paid by the companies it regulates.128 Accounting firms 
must register with the PCAOB before issuing audit reports to the public.129 
In the realm of document retention, audit firms must maintain work papers for seven 
years130 or longer if the PCAOB chooses.131 
122 See supra n.114. 
123 Hamilton, supra note 4, at 6. 
124 Jonathan Shirley, International Law and the Ramifications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 27 BC Int’l & 
Comp. L. Rev. 501, 506 (2004). 
125 SOX § 101. 
126 15 U.S.C. § 7211(a)-(b)(2005). 
127 SOX § 105; 15 U.S.C. § 7215(2005). 
128 SOX § 109; 15 U.S.C. § 7219(2005). 
129 SOX § 102; 15 U.S.C. § 7212(2005). 
130 SOX § 103; 15 U.S.C. § 7213(2005). 
131 SOX § 104(e); 15 U.S.C. § 7214(2005). 
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Large accounting firms (those that audit at least 100 clients) can expect an annual 
PCAOB inspection, and smaller firms can expect a government audit at least every three 
years.132 
Auditing firms may not provide non-audit services to the public companies they audit. 
“The banned services include financial information system design and implementation, appraisal 
or valuation services, internal auditing services, investment banking services, legal and expert 
services unrelated to the audit, brokerage services, and actuarial services.”133 The audit partner 
having primary responsibility for a client’s audit must be rotated every 5 years.134 
SOX applies to foreign accounting firms just as it applies to American firms.135 
2. Board Regulation 
Congress legislated board composition by mandating that public companies have an audit 
committee which is solely responsible for choosing, paying, and receiving the work of external 
auditors.136 Congress also mandated that directors who sit on the audit committee have no 
consulting, advisory, or compensatory connection to the corporation or its subsidiaries.137 The 
audit committee must establish procedures to receive complaints about accounting matters and 
receive confidential, anonymous submissions by employees of concerns regarding accounting 
practices.138 An auditor’s client is now the audit committee, not senior management.139 
132 SOX § 104; 15 U.S.C. § 7214(2005). 
133 Romano, supra note 4, at 1533. See also SOX § 201. 
134 SOX § 203. 
135 Id. § 106; 15 U.S.C. § 7216(2005). 
136 SOX § 301. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Lucci, supra note 4, at 225. 
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3. Executive Regulation 
SOX prevents corporations from making loans to executives or directors.140 Executives at 
Enron, WorldCom, Tyco International, and Adelphia Communications were given hundreds of 
millions in loans.141 
A company’s CEO and CFO must sign financial statements to certify that the statements 
do not contain material misstatements or omissions and “fairly present” their firm’s financial 
condition.142 The signing officers certify that they are responsible for establishing and 
maintaining internal controls.143 SOX provides criminal penalties for violating the certification 
requirement.144 Implicit in this certification requirement is that executives implement internal 
controls and that the executives monitor these controls;145 SOX makes that requirement explicit 
by requiring corporations to file reports assessing the internal controls.146 
If executive misconduct causes a corporation to restate its financial reports, the 
malfeasant executives must forfeit bonuses, incentive-based compensation, and any profit from 
the sale of stock or options made during the previous year.147 
4. Attorney Regulation 
Like auditors, attorneys were primarily self-regulated. Congress created a “report up, 
report out” system where lawyers who find evidence of financial misconduct must report their 
findings to the corporation’s CEO or chief in-house counsel.148 If the executive does not remedy 
the situation, the attorney must report his findings to the audit committee or the board of 
 
140 SOX § 402(a). SOX exempts loans made in the “ordinary course of the consumer credit business” or loans which 
are “generally made available…to the public.” SOX § 402(a). 
141 Romano, supra note 4, at 1538. 
142 SOX § 302. 
143 Id. § 302(a)(4); 15 U.S.C. § 7241(2005). 
144 SOX § 906(a). 
145 Romano, supra note 4, at 1540. 
146 SOX § 404. 
147 Id. § 304; 15 U.S.C. § 7243(2005) 
148 SOX § 307; 15 U.S.C. § 7245(2005). 
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directors.149 If the situation is still not remedied, the attorney should make a “noisy withdrawal” 
where he publicly quits his engagement with the company.150 
Congress also granted the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) power to create 
standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing before it.151 
B. Irish Response 
1. Pre-2001 Governance Provision: Section 150 Orders 
Under Section 150 of the 1990 Companies Act, a court can bar misbehaving directors 
from directing any company for five years.152 Section 160 is even harsher on persons convicted 
of crimes in relation to companies: they are automatically barred from acting as director, 
secretary, auditor, receiver, liquidator, or examiner.153 
2. CLEA 
In the 1990s, Irish corporations had a dismal record when it came to filing corporate 
compliance returns. In 1997, for example, only 13% of the 136,000 companies that had to file 
returns with the Registrar of Companies actually did so.154 The CLEA responded to this problem 
(among others) by establishing a corporate “watchdog” and by providing for harsher criminal 
penalties for officers of companies that failed to file their company’s return.155 
Director of Corporate Enforcement 
The CLEA creates the Director of Corporate Enforcement (DCE or Director), a regulator 
with broad powers over Irish companies.156 The Director has the power to investigate and 
 
149 SOX § 307; 15 U.S.C. § 7245(2005). 
150 Lucci, supra note 4, at 222. 
151 15 U.S.C. § 7245(2005). 
152 Companies Act 1990 § 150. Commonly known as a “Section 150 Order.” 
153 Companies Act 1990 § 160. 
154 Brian Walker, Company Directors: All is About to Change! The New Company Law Enforcement Act of 2001, 8 
Comm. L. Pract. 151, 151 (2001). 
155 Company Law Enforcement Act (2001) § 59 [CLEA]. 
156 Id. § 7. 
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prosecute breaches of the Companies Acts,157 supervise the activity of liquidators and 
receivers,158 demand to see a company’s minutes without giving a reason to see them,159 and 
demand to see any other books or documents if he suspects fraud.160 The DCE is to be made 
privy to the appointment of a receiver and may oversee his work.161 The Director can petition a 
court for search warrants and he has the police power to search a dwelling for material 
information.162 Failing to comply with a DCE document request, submitting false or misleading 
documents to the DCE, or destroying documents are criminal offenses.163 The Director can 
petition the court to disqualify a director from involvement in the management of a company, 
and, if the court approves the petition by issuing a “Section 150 Order,” the director is 
disqualified for five years.164 
Board Regulation 
The major duty that the CLEA imposes on directors and secretaries is the obligation to 
“ensure that the requirements of the Companies Acts are complied with by the company.”165 
Prior to the CLEA, officers merely had to not break the law; now they must actively comply with 
its direction, or face criminal liability for failure to do so. 
As far as individuals are concerned, a bankrupt person may not be a director.166 The DCE 
can require a director he reasonably believes to be bankrupt to make a statement of his personal 
financial position. The court has the power to freeze the assets of an officer if the court thinks 
 
157 Id. § 12(a),(c). 
158 Id. § 12(e). 
159 Id. § 19. 
160 Id. § 29. 
161 Id. §§ 52-53. 
162 Id. § 30. 
163 Id. § 29. 
164 Id. § 40. See also Companies Act 1990 § 150. 
165 CLEA § 100. 
166 Companies Act 1963 § 176. 
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that the officer might frustrate a civil judgment by disposing of his own or company assets.167 
Application for such an order may be made by Companies, directors, shareholders, creditors, 
receivers, liquidators, or the DCE.168 
Auditor Regulation 
The DCE can “demand” to see the qualifications of an auditor and failure to produce 
them is a criminal offense.169 Accounting bodies must report evidence of a members’ breach of 
the Companies Acts.170 
Similar to SOX’s “report up, report out” provision,171 Irish auditors who reasonably 
believe that a company or director has broken the Companies Acts must report that belief to the 
DCE.172 
Bankruptcy and Windups 
Prior to the CLEA, Irish courts had the power to examine directors’ conduct only during 
involuntary wind-ups.173 Now, courts and the DCE can supervise even voluntary wind-ups.174 
The court may order inspection of a company’s books and may order a director to make a 
statement to the court concerning any company property he may have in his possession or any 
debts he owes to the company.175 The director may not refuse to answer for fear of incriminating 
himself.176 
The liquidator of a bankrupt company must apply for Section 150 Orders for the removal 
of all of the company’s directors, regardless of who was actually responsible for the 
 
167 CLEA § 55. 
168 Id. 
169 CLEA § 72. 
170 Id. § 73. 
171 See SOX § 307, 15 U.S.C. §  7245(2005). 
172 CLEA § 74. 
173 Companies Act 1963 § 245. 
174 Id. § 49. 
175 Id. See also id. at § 43. 
176 Id. §§ 44 & 49. 
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bankruptcy.177 If a liquidator uncovers a criminal offense during the course of his work, he must 
report it both to the state criminal prosecutor and the DCE.178 The Director can demand to see 
liquidators’ work regardless of the solvency of the winding-up company.179 The DCE has 
oversight of liquidators and of their professional bodies.180 
3. CAAA 
Auditor Regulation 
 The CAAA established the Irish Auditing and Accounting Supervisory Authority 
(IAASA or Authority).181 The objects of the IAASA are to supervise how accounting bodies 
monitor and regulate their members, to promote adherence to professional standards in the 
accounting industry, to monitor whether companies’ accountings comply with the Companies 
Acts, and to be a source of advice to the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment.182 To 
carry out its objects, the Authority has the power to recognize accounting bodies;183 approve 
accounting bodies’ investigatory procedures, constitutions, and bylaws;184 oversee any 
investigations that accounting bodies may undertake and sanction those bodies that do not 
comply with approved investigatory procedures;185 investigate and sanction breaches of 
accounting standards;186 and review companies’ annual accounts.187 The Authority has the power 
to review a company’s accounting if it questions whether that accounting complies with the 
 
177 Id. § 56. 
178 Id. § 51. In Ireland, criminal prosecutions are handled by the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). 
179 Id. § 57. 
180 Id. § 56-57. 
181 Companies (Auditing & Accounting) Act (2003) § 5(1)[CAAA]. 
182 Id. § 8(1). 
183 Id. § 9(2)(a). 
184 Id. § 9(2)(c). 
185 Id. §§ 9(2)(d)-(e), 23. 
186 Id. §§9(2)(f), 24. 
187 Id. §§9(2)(l), 26. 
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Companies Acts.188 If the Authority finds accounting irregularities, it can petition the court to 
force the company to revise its accounts.189 
The CAAA does not bar auditors from doing non-audit work; it only requires that 
companies disclose what they paid their auditor for both audit and non-audit work.190 
Compliance Statements 
Companies must include in their annual accounting a statement as to whether their 
accounts have been prepared in accordance with “applicable accounting standards.” If their 
accounting does not comply with those standards, the company must include a statement 
describing material departures, the effects of any departures, and the reasons for such a 
departure.191 Failure to include such a statement is a criminal offense.192 Companies must 
disclose the accounting policies they followed in determining the numbers on their balance 
sheets and profit & loss statements.193 
Directors must prepare statements that describe their company’s internal financial 
procedures for securing compliance with the Companies Acts, Irish tax law, and “any other 
enactments that provide a legal framework within which the company operates and that may 
materially affect the company's financial statements.”194 Directors must then acknowledge that 
they are responsible for securing compliance and whether they are of the opinion that “they used 
all reasonable endevours to secure the company’s compliance with its relevant obligations.”195 
188 Id. § 26. 
189 Id. § 26(6). 
190 Id. § 44. 
191 Id. § 41. This provision is often referred as the “Comply or Explain” requirement. It contrasts with what is 
commonly known as the “Comply or Else” provision found in SOX § 302. 
192 CAAA § 41. 
193 Id. § 43. 
194 Id. § 45. 
195 Id. 
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Auditors must then review the directors’ statements and decide if they are “fair and 
reasonable.”196 
Audit Committees 
 Section 42 of the CAAA requires that public companies establish audit committees. The 
audit committee must review the company’s accounts for compliance with applicable accounting 
standards, monitor the performance and quality of the auditor’s work and independence from the 
company, and report to the board of directors its choice of auditor and its recommendation on 
awarding non-audit work to auditors (though the ultimate choice of auditor still lies with the 
board as a whole).197 The audit committee must have at least two members, and members may 
not currently or within the last three years have been employees of the company.198 
C. E.U. Response 
1. Action Plan 
On May 21, 2003, the European Commission (Commission) issued a report entitled 
“Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union” 
(Action Plan).199 The Action Plan contains proposals for legislative and non-legislative action 
that the E.U. plans to implement over the coming years. While the Action Plan covers many 
subjects,200 this paper only reviews those germane to corporate governance. The Commission 
concluded that there was no need for an E.U.-wide, super-national corporate governance code.201 
It instead proposed that the E.U.’s role in improving corporate governance was to facilitate 
 
196 Id. 
197 Id. § 42. 
198 Id. 
199 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament -- Modernising Company 
Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union -- A Plan to Move Forward, COM (2003) 284 
final (May 2003)[Action Plan]. 
200 The Action Plan addresses corporate governance, capital maintenance and alteration, groups & pyramids, 
corporate restructuring and mobility, the European private company, the European Co-operative Society and other 
E.U. legal forms of enterprise, and enhancing the transparency of national legal forms of enterprise. 
201 Action Plan at 11. 
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convergence and exchange of best practices.202 The Action Plan addressed ways to enhance 
corporate governance disclosure, strengthen shareholders’ rights, modernize the board of 
directors, and coordinate Member State corporate governance efforts. 
Enhancing Corporate Governance Disclosure 
The Action Plan proposed that public companies include a statement of their corporate 
governance structure in their annual reports. The statement should include a list of shareholders’ 
rights and how to exercise them, a description of how the board and its committees operate, a list 
of major shareholders and how their ownership affects voting and control rights, disclosure of 
any other relationships between the company and these major shareholders, disclosure of 
material transactions with other related parties, and disclosure of the existence and nature of a 
risk management system.203 The Commission proposed that a Directive would best foment these 
goals.204 
The Action Plan further proposed that institutional investors disclose their investment 
policy and their policy on exercising voting rights, and to disclose, when beneficiaries ask, how 
these voting rights have been exercised in a particular case.205 
Strengthening Shareholders’ Rights 
 The Commission proposed that companies use electronic facilities to send relevant 
information to shareholders in advance of shareholder meetings.206 This would allow 
shareholders to more effectively exercise their rights to ask questions, to table resolutions, and to 
participate and vote in abstentia by electronic means.207 The Commission suggested that a 
 
202 Id. at 11-12. 
203 Id. at  12-13. 
204 Id. at 13. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. 
207 Id. at 14. 
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Directive would best solve the “legal difficulties” involved in implementing this part of the 
plan.208 
Modernizing the Board of Directors 
 The Action Plan suggests that independent directors should make decisions where 
executive directors have conflicts of interest. The proposed areas include director remuneration 
and supervision of the audit.209 The Action Plan proposes that shareholders receive information 
regarding individual director’s remuneration and that shareholders approve any director share or 
option compensation.210 Directors should be collectively responsible for financial statements and 
the annual corporate governance statement. To force that responsibility on directors, the 
Commission proposed that shareholders who hold a certain percentage of shares have a special 
investigation right into the affairs of the company, that directors be personally liable for failing to 
adequately deal with the company’s debts, and that directors be disqualified across the E.U. for 
issuing misleading company statements.211 The Commission proposed that the E.U. adopt a 
Recommendation to effect these changes.212 
Coordinating Member State Corporate Governance Efforts 
 The Commission suggested a “European Corporate Governance Forum” (Forum) to serve 
as a clearinghouse for coordination and convergence of Member State governance laws.213 The 
Forum came into existence on October 18, 2004.214 
208 Id. 
209 Id. at 15. 
210 Id. at 16. 
211 Id. 
212 Id. 
213 Id. at 17. 
214 See the Commission's announcement on October 18, 2004, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/1241&format=HTML&aged=0&langu 
age=EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited November 12, 2005). 
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2. Transparency Directive 
On December 15, 2004, the E.U. adopted a Directive on minimum transparency 
requirements for listed companies.215 The goal of the Directive is to improve the information 
available to investors, thus helping them allocate funds on the basis of a more informed 
assessment of a company. The Directive seeks to ensure that investors receive interim 
management statements from companies who do not publish quarterly reports, and bi-annual 
financial reports from issuers of new bonds. In addition, all securities issuers will have to provide 
annual financial reports within four months of the end of the financial year. The Directive is due 
to be implemented no later than January 2007. 
3. Recommendations on Director’s Remuneration and the Role of Independent Directors 
 On October 6, 2004, the Commission adopted Recommendations on directors' 
remuneration216 and on the role of independent non-executive directors on listed companies' 
boards.217 The former recommends that Member States force listed companies to disclose their 
policy on directors' remuneration and tell shareholders how much individual directors are 
earning and in what form, and ensure shareholders are given adequate control over these matters 
and over share-based remuneration schemes. The latter focuses on the role of non-executive or 
supervisory directors in key areas where executive or managing directors may have conflicts of 
interest. It recommends minimum standards for the qualifications, commitment, and 
independence of non-executive or supervisory directors. 
 
215 Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on the 
harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are 
admitted to trading on a regulated market and amending Directive 2001/34/EC. 
216 Commission Recommendation (2004/913/EC) of 14 December 2004 on fostering an appropriate regime for the 
remuneration of directors of listed companies. 
217 Commission Recommendation (2005/162/EC) of 15 February 2005 on the role of non-executive or supervisory 
directors of listed companies and on the committees of the (supervisory) board. 
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4. Accounting Directives 
 On May 31, 2001, the E.U. adopted a Directive mandating that Member States permit or 
require the use of fair value valuation methods to account for certain classes of financial 
instruments in companies' annual financial statements.218 This Directive will therefore enable 
European companies to prepare annual financial statements in accordance with international 
developments. Companies will be required to provide additional information in the notes to the 
accounts on the items that have been valued at fair value. 
 On June 18, 2003, the E.U. adopted a Directive to bring existing E.U. rules into line with 
current best practice.219 It requires all E.U. companies listed on a regulated market to use 
International Accounting Standards from 2005 onwards and allows Member States to extend this 
requirement to all companies. 
5. Proposal for an Auditing Directive 
The E.U. responded to scandals in the U.S. and Europe with a March 2004 proposal for a 
directive that would tighten audit rules in E.U. Member States.220 Inspired by SOX’s 
establishment of the PCAOB, 221 the proposal calls for public oversight of auditors and 
regulatory cooperation with the other states’ oversight bodies. 
The proposed directive would end European auditors’ self regulation by mandating that 
Member States set up regulatory bodies like the PCAOB and the IAASA. Public companies 
 
218 Directive 2001/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2001 amending Directives 
78/660/EEC, 83/349/EEC and 86/635/EEC as regards the valuation rules for the annual and consolidated accounts 
of certain types of companies as well as of banks and other financial institutions. 
219 Directive 2003/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2003 amending Directives 
78/660/EEC, 83/349/EEC, 86/635/EEC and 91/674/EEC on the annual and consolidated accounts of certain types of 
companies, banks and other financial institutions and insurance undertakings. 
220 Commission Proposal of 16 March 2004 for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
statutory audit of annual accounts and consolidated accounts and amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 
83/349/EEC. 
221 But see Commission Proposal of 16 March 2004 for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on statutory audit of annual accounts and consolidated accounts and amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 
83/349/EEC p.2 (“This proposal is not a knee-jerk reaction to recent corporate scandals. It is the logical consequence 
of a reorientation of the EU policy on statutory audit started back in 1996.”). 
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would be required to establish American-style independent audit committees responsible for 
hiring, overseeing, and firing auditors. Auditors from outside the E.U. would have to register 
with the Member State’s auditor regulator. The proposal does not call for a complete ban on 
auditors providing non-audit services; it instead would ban the provision of these services if 
doing so would compromise independence and in all cases would ban auditor involvement in 
making company management decisions. 
V. Analysis: Proportionality and Convergence 
At least two issues come up when discussing international corporate scandals and 
government responses: whether the responses are proportionate to the problem and whether 
governments are coming up with similar solutions to similar problems. 
A. Proportionality 
Commentators often note how quickly SOX became law. Enron collapsed on November 
9, 2001, and President George W. Bush signed SOX into law less than nine months later.222 By 
contrast, the Irish and the Europeans took more time before passing legislation. The reason for 
this disparity in time may be founded on the size of the problems. 
1. American Response 
America had a much bigger problem than the Irish or the Europeans. American scandals 
were measured in billions, Irish only in millions. Furthermore, an American imprimatur touches 
every old-world scandal: Elan is headquartered in New York, trades on the NYSE, and conducts 
its activities mainly in the U.S. AIB’s troubles came from an American trader working at an 
American subsidiary. It was sued by an American investor in an American court. Ahold’s 
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problems were the result of misfeasance at an American subsidiary.223 Parmalat could not have 
hid so much debt for so long without the complicity of Bank of America and American auditors 
Grant Thornton and Deloitte & Touche. Scandals in Ireland and Europe are American scandals 
too. 
2. Irish Response 
When Ireland passed the CAAA, it responded with more harshness to less of a problem. 
The CAAA contains many provisions similar to SOX: both created auditing regulatory bodies; 
both address auditors and non-audit work; both mandate audit committees; both have “report up, 
report out” provisions; and both require companies and directors to certify the accuracy of 
financial statements. However, there are numerous differences within the similarities: the CAAA 
has more criminal penalties for the IAASA, DCE, and DPP to enforce; American auditors may 
not provide non-audit services whereas Irish auditors are only barred from providing services 
that lead to conflicts of interest; Irish directors, even if they are not currently employed by the 
company, may not sit on the audit committee if they were employed within the last three years; 
SOX allows attorneys to “report up, report out” whereas CLEA requires auditors to report 
company law breaches to the DCE; Ireland requires directors, companies, and auditors to sign off 
on the accuracy of financial statements whereas the U.S. only requires directors and companies 
to sign compliance statements.224 Furthermore, Irish companies have to deal with the DCE 
whose sole job is to enforce the Companies Acts—their criminal provisions and all. While 
certain provisions of SOX may be harsher than certain provisions of CAAA, when one considers 
 
223 But see Europe’s Enron, Economist, Mar. 1, 2003 (The fact that Ahold’s accounting problems occurred primarily 
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the full extent of the Companies Acts (i.e., Section 150 Orders), the power of the DCE, and the 
fact that Ireland had less of a corporate crisis to begin with, Ireland’s attempts to prevent future 
corporate malfeasance are disproportionate to the problem. 
Surely Ireland had corporate problems, but they were compliance issues, not governance 
issues. Ireland responded to its compliance problems: it passed the CLEA which created the 
DCE to act as a watchdog. The CLEA deals more with compliance than governance – it was 
passed in early 2001, before Enron and other problems came to light in late 2001. It forces 
companies to answer to the government, not to stakeholders. Even so, the CLEA is harsh: the 
DCE has incredible power – police power, prosecutorial power, regulatory power, banishment 
power. The Director himself can make a company’s life very hard; there is not really any one 
American regulator with that much power. 
3. E.U. Response 
This quote aptly demonstrates the need for E.U. corporate regulation: 
Italy has a reputation for poor corporate governance combined with the shameless 
exploitation of minority shareholders. But much the same can be said of other European 
countries, including France, the Netherlands and Switzerland, where this week Adecco, 
the world's largest temporary-employment agency, said it expects to delay the 
announcement of its 2003 results because of "possible accounting, control and 
compliance issues...in certain countries". Most European countries have mere codes of 
practice for corporate governance, rather than legal statutes, and progress towards 
meeting the standards of the codes has been patchy at best.225 
The E.U. has taken an almost academic response to scandals, publishing studies and 
proposals rather than much binding legislation. The main conclusion of the Action Plan was that 
the E.U. did not need a Union-wide corporate governance code.226 The E.U. sees its role as a 
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body that facilitates exchange of best practices rather than a creator or mandator of practices.227 
As such, it will be for the E.U. to study the effects of SOX, CLEA, and CAAA and propose their 
pearls to other European countries. It created the European Corporate Governance Forum to do 
just that. 
The E.U. legislation passed this millennium has mandated certain practices, but the E.U. 
legislated only to foment its convergence goal. Convergence is taken up at length in Part V.B. 
B. Convergence 
Ideas come from the Americans, get distilled by the Europeans, and applied by states as 
they see fit. Ireland saw fit to copy the audit regulator, audit committee, and have directors 
personally sign off on financial statements. European states do not wholly plagiarize American 
statutes, however. To use Ireland as an example, their audit regulator, audit committees, and 
sign-off rules, though inspired by the Americans, have a local flare. Nonetheless, corporate 
governance rules are converging and Irish and European laws passed since the turn of the 
millennium show this movement. 
1. World-Wide Catalyst: Enron 
Enron was a catalyst around the world. The antecedent of the E.U. Action Plan was a 
desire to “review further corporate governance and auditing issues in the light of the Enron 
case.”228 The Economist wrote that “Europeans should stop smugly believing that corporate 
malfeasance is an American vice that cannot occur in the old continent. Instead, they should fix 
their corporate-governance and accounting problems with as much vigour as their American 
 
227 Id. at 11-12. 
228 See Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on a Modern Regulatory Framework for Company 
Law in Europe (November 4, 2002), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/company/ 
company/modern/consult/report_en.pdf (last accessed November 12, 2005). 
37
cousins showed after the Enron wake-up call.”229 SOX “seems to have kicked Europe's 
protracted process into gear. ‘Parmalat was an extra boost, but the real motor was Sarbanes-
Oxley,’ says Neil Lerner, head of regulatory issues at KPMG, an auditing firm. ‘Europe had to 
stand up and be counted.’”230 
European scandals sparked European action too. “The [Ahold] scandal should dispel 
claims about the supposed inherent superiority of continental Europe's two-tier boards over 
Anglo-Saxon unitary boards. Ahold's supervisory board was at least as dominated by [Ahold 
CEO Cees] van der Hoeven as any American board was by its chief executive.”231 
2. Convergence in Regulation 
As night follows day, the IAASA followed the PCAOB in taking away auditor self-
regulation. If the E.U. had its way, auditors’ self-regulation would end because every Member 
State would set up an auditor regulatory body of its own.232 The PCAOB and IAASA surely have 
their differences: the members of the PCAOB are all independent, whereas the IAASA 
membership is comprised of accounting and other financial bodies.233 But to the average auditor, 
he is now governed by and paying fees to a government body that did not exist prior to the 
corporate scandals. 
All three governments would require foreign auditors to register with a regulatory body, 
and all three seek to tighten rules about how auditors provide non-audit work. 
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3. Convergence in Board Structures 
Audit committees are “a new concept in Irish company law.”234 Now, the U.S. and 
Ireland require them and the E.U. wants to mandate them. All three governments insist that the 
committees be comprised of independent directors even though they define independence 
differently. Here as elsewhere there are issues of efficacy: “[t]he parallels with America's 
corporate scandals do not end with the fallibility of auditors. The lack of independence of non-
executive directors on the board is another issue in common. Parmalat's was stuffed with family 
members and local cronies. Despite a 1999 reform that imposed independent directors on listed 
Italian companies, big ones such as Parmalat were allowed to opt out.”235 
4. Convergence in Transparency 
Irish and American public companies must disclose so much more than they used to do. 
Ethics codes, internal controls, accounting policies, work papers, and “report up, report out” are 
all new requirements created to make the governance of individual companies more apparent to 
the public. 
5. Convergence in Responsibility 
Both SOX and the CAAA make directors personally liable for their company’s financial 
statements by requiring that they sign them to attest to their accuracy. As in all things, there are 
differences: Ireland requires directors, companies, and auditors to sign off on the accuracy of 
financial statements whereas the U.S. only requires executives to sign compliance statements. 
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Some have questioned whether this will hurt Ireland’s position as an attractive location for 
foreign investment.236 
VI. Conclusion 
Convergence is necessary because Parmalat was not just an Italian problem, Ahold was 
not just a Dutch concern, and Enron was not just an American crisis. “The question is whether 
Europe's principles-based approach can endure.”237 The answer seems to be no: Europe is 
moving to a rules-based approach where government mandates the use of certain accounting 
standards and states regulate every aspect of the company. 
Convergence would neither be total nor without critics. “America's rules are much more 
prescriptive and numerous. For example, the American ban on accounting firms providing some 
(but not all) non-audit work to audit clients, the certification of company accounts by company 
bosses and the requirement that a ‘financial expert’ (painstakingly defined by the SEC) be on 
each audit committee do not feature in the [E.U.] proposals.”238 Europeans have questioned the 
efficacy of some American ideas: “[r]otation of auditors--one of the more controversial measures 
introduced in July 2002 by the Sarbanes-Oxley act, America's response to Enron, WorldCom and 
other corporate scandals--seems to have been of little use [in Italy].”239 Rotation of auditors may 
have been of little use in Parmalat, but we simply cannot know how many time bombs rotation 
has diffused. 
On balance, the U.S. has the soft power to influence worldwide corporate governance and 
the E.U. has the hard power to converge its Members’ laws. Through its legislative power to 
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regulate and direct Member law, the E.U. has streamlined European corporate law and 
governance. If its proposals and action plans are any indication, it plans to do more. Ireland is a 
prime example of the European move towards American-style rules-based governance. 
